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Science as a prejudice 
A "scientific" interpretation of the world . . . 
might yet be one of the most stupid of all possi-
ble interpretations of the world, in the sense 
that it would be one of the poorest in meaning. 
This thought is intended for the ears and con-
sciences of our mechanists who nowadays like to 
pass as philosophers and insist that mechanics is 
the doctrine of the first and last laws on which 
all existence must be based as on a ground floor. 
But an essentially mechanical world would be an 
essentially meaningless world. Suppose that one 
estimated the value of a piece of music according 
to how much of it could be counted, calculated, 
and expressed in formulas: how absurd would such 
a "scientific" estimation of music be! What 
would one have comprehended, understood, grasped 
of it? Nothing, really nothing of what is "mu-
sic" in it! 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
Thf: Q aY Science section 373 
Of course Nietzsche was not opposed to science 
(Wissenschaft); he held an extremely high regard for 
it. The quotes surrounding the word 'scientific' in 
the passage indicate that it is a peculiar conception 
of science he is disparaging—one which construes the 
method of natural science as the supreme model for all 
knowledge-productive inquiries into the nature of human 
experience. Calling in Nietzsche from left field to 
hurl an objection at Quine may seem impertinent but is 
not as arbitrary as might first appear. For Nietzsche 
was among the first major thinkers to prescribe an in-
vestigation into the extent to which language seduces 
its users into holding beliefs of a scientifically 
dubious and metaphysical kind.1 
But—it must be admitted—the spirit in which 
Nietzsche called for such an analysis of language is 
not the spirit "in which Quine conducts it. For at the 
heart of Nietzsche's comment above is the question of 
the value of science within the overall experience of 
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man, whereas Quine's attitude in this respect may 
safely be called dogmatic. The value of scientific in-
quiry is not a thing to be questioned for Quine; its 
pragmatic benefits are evident enough. Still, Nietz-
sche's questioning of the dogma might yet be regarded 
as truer to the traditional spirit of science. 
These reflections do not imply a preference of one 
sense of scientific over another, nor need they oblige 
one to explicate what is meant by the word 
'scientific'. The difference can be sufficiently ac-
counted for by resorting to the traditional distinction 
between science and philosophy. Quine treats the 
distinction as only a matter of degree, the philoso-
pher's task differing from that of the scientist only 
"in detail." Both are concerned "to save the eventual 
connections with nonverbal stimulation';7 the philo-
sopher merely does his job at a further remove, sup-
porting the scientific enterprise the cutting edge of 
which is empirical science itself. Nietzsche sees em-
pirical science as exemplifying certain presuppositions 
which, however valuable they may be to science itself, 
the seeker after knowledge cannot take for granted and 
must be prepared to question. Such a taking of ac-
counts has traditionally been the business of 
philosophy. 
What follows is an attempt to assess Quine's scien-
tific conception of philosophy. Concern with disposi-
tions to verbal behavior, "naturalized" epistemology, 
the primacy of sensory evidence, the guiding principles 
for theory, the need for a specialized notation, and 
the dispensability of intensional language are the 
chief features of Quine's program which place philoso-
phy on a par with science and thereby relieve it of its 
formerly exalted duties. Whether Quine's reallocation 
of philosophy is legitimate depends upon the cogency 
with which he has emphasized these features. 
But according to what criteria is one to be 
convinced? How exactly is one to judge of his theory's 
cogency? These questions already reach to the heart of 
the problem, for if we choose to be satisfied on the 
basis of the extent to which Quine's discussion meets 
the standards of scientific method and scientific effi-
cacy, then we are already playing into his hands. This 
is because these are the very virtues which Quine has 
striven assiduously to realize in laying out his 
claims. Quine mentions these virtues time and again. 
Conformity to observation, simplicity or conceptual e-
conomy, conservatism or familiarity of principle, 
clarity, and predictability are the chief among them 
(Word and Object 18-21). Quine argues for behaviorism, 
naturalized epistemology, canonical notation, etc. on 
the strength of their individual and combined capacity 
to exemplify these guiding principles of science. 
Thus, if an account contrary to Quine's is to be 
convincing at all, it must show either (1) that his 
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program does not actually exemplify these principles, 
or (2) that these principles are actually pernicious to 
the acquisition of knowledge, or (3) that there are ad-
ditional considerations which should recommend a 
knowledge-producing activity to us. 
Even if the first alternative is achievable, estab-
lishing it would constitute no substantial gain in pre-
serving the traditional status of philosophy. For the 
crucial question is not whether Quine's program actu-
ally conforms to these guiding principles, but whether 
these principles are necessary and sufficient to 
satisfy the knowledge demands of human beings. The 
second alternative, on the face of it, anyone would be 
a fool to affirm. For it is hard to imagine how any 
rational inquiry would benefit by ignoring any of these 
precepts of method; no doubt philosophy has always been 
most effective when practiced in accordance with them. 
However, though it is plain one would be a fool not to 
see them as necessary, it is not at all clear that 
these guiding principles are sufficient. And this 
brings us to alternative number three: whether there 
are additional considerations which ought to be taken 
into account when deciding upon the adequacy of a 
theory of knowledge. 
Before suggesting what these other considerations 
might be, a closer look at Quine's recommendations for 
the proper method of philosophy will spotlight certain 
aspects of his theory against which the question of 
adequacy can be raised. For the moment it is enough to 
assert that the adequacy of a theory of knowledge must 
be determined not only by the extent to which it con-
forms to Quine's precepts of guidance in science and by 
its ability to tell us what knowledge is and how it is 
acquired, but also because it accounts for the role and 
function which knowledge plays in human experience as a 
whole. 
II 
Quine is known for trenchant criticisms of empiri-
cism, but his misgivings about it go only so deep. Two 
cardinal tenets of empiricism he considers impervious: 
(1) all evidence for science is sensory evidence and 
(2) all learning of meanings of words rests ultimately 
on sensory evidence.* An additional tenet which Quine 
takes to be just as solid is more controversial: 
"words mean only as their use in sentences is condi-
tioned to sensory stimuli, verbal and otherwise. Any 
realistic theory of evidence must be inseparable from 
the psychology of stimulus and response applied to 
sentences" (see Word and Object 17). 
This is just Quine 1s formulation of behaviorism as 
applied to human beings. The unique aspect of human 
beings concerning the behavioral scientist is language; 
language and the meaning conveyed by language appear to 
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the behaviorist as natural phenomena not fundamentally 
different as objects of study from any other element in 
nature, and thus are to be studied in the same sort of 
way. So what human beings mean by what they say is 
tantamount to the totality of their dispositions to 
verbal behavior. The philosopher, then, insofar as he 
is a behaviorist, is not concerned with studying some 
preternatural subject matter, some noumenon such as a 
mind, but verbal behavior as conditioned by sensory 
stimuli. 
A major problem for the philosopher here is to ex-
plain why language is much more than a mere reporting 
of sensory stimulation; how is it that complex patterns 
of communication take place? Quine sees that the re-
tainment in memory of past experiences is central here. 
But these experiences are retained less as traces of 
past sensations than as traces of past "conceptualiza-
tions" (Word and Obj_ect 10). Conceptualization Quine 
holds to be inseparable from language, but he is not 
clear as to just what a conceptualization is. 
Presumably, it must be an association of various sti-
muli retained together as a conditioned response to 
certain situations and which is itself associated 
loosely enough with other situations so as to apply to 
any number of them. This latter association is possi-
ble only because of a verbal network of theory which 
links one uttered conceptualization as a stimulus to 
other conceptualizations as possible responses. This 
network of theory Quine calls the "interanimation of 
sentences." 
Quine's talk of conceptualizations may perhaps best 
be understood in a manner somewhat similar to Hume's 
account of abstract ideas. The point is not that Quine 
thinks of conceptualizations as Humean ideas exactly, 
but rather that a conceptualization is conditioned ac-
cording to the same sort of mechanism which Hume says 
leads us to think that some ideas are abstract. For 
Hume all general ideas are nothing but particular ones 
annexed to a common term which gives them a more exten-
sive significance because the hearing of this term 
stimulates our power to recall any particular idea as-
sociated with that term. Thus, Hume says, these ideas 
(and, I am suggesting, Quine's conceptualizations) are 
not present to the mind actually but "only in power."* 
In any event, this "custom" of itself would allow 
no more than repetition of past conceptualizations were 
it not for the intervening network of sentences which 
enables us to "exploit" them—i.e., to use them in in-
telligently complicated ways. One might be inclined to 
infer that the connections between the sentences com-
posing this network would be first and foremost logical 
and that this logical dimension would hold the network 
together. But this would be rather like crediting the 
effectiveness with which a lifeguard performed his job 
to his suntan. According to Quine those logical con-
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nections, though they look impressive, are incidental 
and due (like every other connection) to the condition-
ing of sentences as responses to sentences as stimuli. 
Connections are logical only in the sense that they 
refer to so-called logical laws which are themselves 
sentences within the network. 
This may be consistent, but is it satisfying? How 
could stimulus-response conditioning alone give the 
force of logic to these connections? One need not be 
enamored of logic to think that its existence is 
remarkable, too remarkable to allow that stimulus-
response conditioning alone can account for it. Just 
as easily would one believe Hume had truly explained 
all thought processes in terms of resemblance, conti-
guity, and causation. 
But the point here is not to give Quine a demerit 
for failing to answer an extremely difficult question, 
rather it is to emphasize that he has ignored it. In 
general, the behaviorist program affords the philo-
sopher the luxury of dispensing with traditionally 
recalcitrant problems. Quine is aware of this. 
Regarding propositional attitudes he has said that to 
clear them away "is not to have made scientific sense 
of them" (Word and Object 216). Even less is it to 
make philosophicai sense of them. This is because the 
behaviorist point of view is, at bottom, only quasi-
philosophical. Insofar as a problem can be neatly ex-
cised from that perspective it is no longer a legiti-
mate (i.e., scientific) problem at all. The scientific 
philosopher touts this as a great boon for knowledge 
and thereby often makes ignorance a virtue. 
One may be tempted to reconsider the half-hearted 
suggestion made earlier that Quine's list of guiding 
principles for scientific philosophy could be detrimen-
tal to the pursuit of knowledge. This seemed highly 
unlikely since each of these precepts seemed necessary 
to any rational inquiry. But what if these principles 
are nevertheless insufficient? What if the set of 
precepts which guide the search for knowledge must, 
because they reflect human concerns which are not ad-
dressed satisfactorily by science, include some tenets 
which are not merely expedient and pragmatic? One 
result of neglecting these further concerns appears to 
be that certain traditionally important problems may no 
longer be counted as problems. Such a radical conse-
quence should at least be regarded with caution, 
because if it is a mistake, then the principles of a 
purely scientific philosophy, when taken as sufficient 
to satisfy the interests human beings have in acquiring 
knowledge, may actually have counterproductive effects. 
Ill 
Quine's attitude toward ordinary language is mixed. 
Ordinary language is indispensable, but for the scien-
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tific philosophor it is too seriously flawed to use in 
constructing theory. Though the resources for inquiry 
are present in it, the philosopher must mine it and 
refine it so as to make it suitable for the work of 
science. The sort of refinement needed is not a matter 
of replacing ordinary language but rather of extending 
it to a scientific level. Science's ontological com-
mitment reqires that it deal with empirical facts, and 
this can be done only through purely extensional 
language. Thus, what is needed is to modify ordinary 
language so as to remove vagueness, ambiguity, and opa-
city as regards mechanisms of reference when these af-
fect sentences whose truth values hinge on such 
confusions. 
Quine's main point against the view that ordinary 
language can serve the purposes of science is that this 
view is blind to one of language's most significant 
traits: its disposition to evolve. Quine's conception 
of linguistic evolution is central, for he sees its 
significance not in a blind progression of usage of or-
dinary language itself but in its tractability—its 
disposition to be fashioned to suit human purposes such 
as science. "Scientific neologism is itself just lin-
guist evolution gone self-conscious, as science is 
self-conscious common sense" (Word and Object 3 ) . To 
fashion a language appropriate to science is not a mat-
ter of reduction but evolution; a continuity between 
ordinary language and the canonical language is 
sustained. The difference between ordinary language 
and the technical language is a matter of 
"regimentation," where the latter is a conscious refor-
mulation or paraphrase of the former designed to real-
ize some preconceived aim. 
If it is asked what this aim is we find Quine con-
sistently resorting to the guiding principles of sci-
ence already mentioned. In particular he cites the 
central motive as "simplification of theory." Simpli-
fication proceeds by paraphrasing ordinary language 
into an artificial notation so as not to burden theory 
with quirks of usage. The paraphrase is not claimed as 
synonymous, however. "If we paraphrase a sentence to 
resolve ambiguity, what we seek is not a synonymous 
sentence, but one that is more informative by dint of 
resisting some alternative interpretations" (Word and 
Object 159. Ideally the original speaker would do his 
own paraphrasing, thereby streamlining and clarifying 
his own position. 
But to describe this process as evolution is mis-
leading. It connotes that the manner in which Quine 
proposes to regiment ordinary language is the natural 
one. One should not forget that this evolution is a 
deliberate reworking of ordinary language with an eye 
toward a specific end: the adoption in practice of the 
guiding principles which constitute Quine's conception 
of science and philosophy. Quine believes that this 
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involves no compromise of freedom; after all the only 
objective here is economy and clarity (Word and Object 
161-62). But this is not as innocuous as it appears, 
because a great deal depends upon what Quine's concep-
tion of clarity is. What may be perfectly clear to the 
platonist is often obscure to the positivist. Is it 
really so easy or so wise to treat the concept of 
clarity as unproblematic? Whatever can be said for the 
clarity of the notion of clarity as regards science, 
the situation is different in philosophy. Insofar as a 
philosopher unwittingly accepts Quine's program of 
canonical notation he tacitly adopts Quine's conception 
of what constitutes a clear exposition and, accord-
ingly, compromises his freedom. Philosophical controv-
ersies are not to be settled by regulations governing 
peoples' choice of words. A school of thought which 
advocates this sort of conformity is, at least implic-
itly, less concerned with freedom of thought than with 
serving its own ends. 
IV 
A major consequence of Quine's regimentation is the 
prohibition of the use of intensional language in fram-
ing theories. Two problems with intensional language 
make its use especially undesirable. The conditions 
for identifying certain abstract objects make an em-
pirical study of them virtually impossible. More gen-
erally, the methods used when employing intensional id-
ioms go against the grain of objective science. 
Concerning the first problem, Quine shows, for ex-
ample, that the very question of conditions of identity 
for such things as propositions is utterly wrongheaded. 
For even when one construes a proposition in behavioral 
terms as an eternal sentence its identity will still 
rest on whether the proposition expressed by that sen-
tence has a meaning which can be shared by other eter-
nal sentences. The search for a suitable account of 
synonymy which could settle the matter however is 
fruitless. The reason is that any behavioral test for 
synonymy in contexts of propositional attitude is 
inscrutable. There is no proposition objectively 
related to languages such that one could identify it 
independently of language. However one decides to 
translate the proposition expressed by some sentence so 
as to indicate its synonymy with another proposition 
will depend on some arbitrary set of "analytical 
hypotheses." These are arbitrary because there may be 
many sets of analytical hypotheses which could be used 
to frame a translation which are all compatible with 
the totality of dispositions to verbal behavior. So 
propositions, as objects of propositional attitudes, 
are impractical for any genuinely scientific enter-
prise. It is worth noting that this is all of a piece 
with Quine's doctrine of inscrutability of reference 
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regarding terms generally. The reference of a term, 
like identity of propositions, is not an empirical 
question. There is neither term synonymy nor term 
identity in the sense of there being some determinate 
objective thing to which a term "really" refers. 
The second, more general problem with intensional 
locutions is that their method of employment is not 
conducive to objective science. Quine's treatments of 
modality, indirect discourse, and irreducibility of in-
tensional idioms illustrate this. The difficulty with 
modal constructions is that they cannot be fitted into 
the technical notation that would help to clarify their 
significance. The reason is that modal contexts are 
referentially opaque and thereby resist any consistent 
attempt to quantify into them. Quine's analysis on 
this point is very impressive and worth a brief 
explanation. 
Quine shows that trying to reinterpret a modal ex-
pression as predicating analyticity of a sentence is 
unavailing for at least two reasons. First, the use of 
quotation marks as a means of mentioning the sentence 
has the consequence of failing to preserve truth 
value.* Second,- Quine's reflections have led him to 
hold that the notion of analyticity itself is of 
dubious integrity.' But even if one tries a different 
tack and construes a modal construction such as neces-
sity as a logical operator, the principle of substi-
tutivity, as Quine calls it, is violated; i.e., an ob-
ject may be specifiable by more than one term such that 
some traits entailed by one specification of the object 
are not entailed by another, in which case these spe-
cifications fail of necessary equivalence and cannot be 
.substituted one for another. Further, if through 
desperation one attempts to narrow the universe of .ob-
jects so as to exclude objects whose specifications 
fail of necessary equivalence, one is met by another 
difficulty: modal distinctions collapse altogether. 
The problem here, ultimately, is that the conception of 
substitutivity which trades on the notion of equivalent 
descriptions such that each description uniquely deter-
mines one and the same object simply does not capture 
the logical sense of necessity. Now since the premium 
Quine places on transparency of reference is the 
highest, modal contexts pose a seemingly insoluble pro-
blem as regards regimentation; fortunately for Quine, 
however, scientific philosophy doesn't need them. 
Indirect quotation is probably the most candid ex-
ample of Quine's complaint that intensional idioms are 
in direct contrast with the spirit of objective sci-
ence. Indirect quotation is unabashedly inexact and, 
as Quine would have it, "essentially dramatic." 
Indeed, propositional attitudes as a whole partake pri-
marily of drama. What is involved in all of them is 
"something like quotation of' one's own imagined verbal 
response to an imagined situation" (Word and Object 
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219). Thus, ascriptions of beliefs, wishes, and striv-
ings, no matter how conscientiously utilized, remain 
inassimilable into scientific discourse at its best. 
Indirect quotation can figure only as better or worse, 
as more or less faithful, and there is no fixed stan-
dard of allowable deviation in one's report of the an-
tecedent physical incident. 
Of course, eschewing the use of such intensional 
idioms does not prevent a strictly scientific reporting 
o f the behavior that underlies imputations of proposi-
tional attitudes. One may wonder, however, what philo-
sophical scope and relevance such reportings would 
have. There are, after all, some facts which would 
seem to be irreducible to behaviorist terms unless they 
were to lose the very properties which constitute their 
status as facts. Searle's "institutional facts" are of 
this sort. 7 To account for every aspect of human 
behavior in strictly scientific terms with respect to 
"nerve hits" and "surface irritations" would be ludi-
crous. With some irony one could paraphrase Hume: 
"Though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were 
ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, 
if not an absolute assurance, that it lias carried us 
quite beyond the point of reasonableness when it leads 
to conclusions so extraordinary and so remote from com-
mon life and experience. We are got into fairy land 
long ere we have reached the last steps of our 
theory."• 
In any case, to have bypassed intensional vocabu-
lary by implementing a more scientifically favorable 
means of expression is not to have explained the inten-
sional dimension in these terms. Quine realizes that 
there is no reducibility of intensional idioms to phys-
ical or behavioral criteria. But this just means that 
intensional language, as far as scientific philosophy 
is concerned, must be renounced. 
Seen in this light science appears as a truly 
charmed vocation, free to dispense with those refrac-
tory elements of human experience which fail of accom-
modation to its precepts. One should ask, however, 
whether these are things which philosophy, too, may be 
allowed to ignore. According to Quine the answer is 
yes; philosophy, as well as science, is guided by prag-
matic aims. One may note as a not so very strange 
coincidence that the moment philosophers envision their 
task on the model of empirical science and try to fash-
ion it according to that idea, they see the starting 
points and the ends of philosophy as constrained by 
that selfsame point of view. Philosophy begins with 
sense perception as the sole basis for evidence and it 
ends as an activity with aims even more pragmatic than 
science itself--it becomes a handmaiden. 
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V 
A question raised earlier in this paper concerned 
the problem of assessing the adequacy of a theory of 
knowledge. Mo systematic attempt will be made to solve 
this problem here, but one may wonder whether it is a 
problem which scientific philosophy is competent to an-
swer at all. When Quine approaches it he immediately 
becomes dogmatic. "Epistemology is concerned with the 
foundations of science," and thus, "natural knowledge 
is to be based somehow on sense experience."' On his 
view epistemology boils down to a matter of understand-
ing the link between observation and science, and the 
guiding principles of science furnish the criteria ac-
cording to which this understanding is to be gained. 
For Quine then the issue of assessing the adequacy of a 
theory of knowledge has relevance only within the 
domain of science itself. He could see no other sensi-
ble way of handling the problem. 
We are left alone then with the question what other 
considerations are pertinent to assessing the adequacy 
of a theory of knowledge. Among other things a theory 
of knowledge should account for the role and function 
of knowledge in human experience as a whole. But this 
cannot be done if the evidence for human experience is 
limited to stimulus and response. Understanding human 
behavior must include a further basis for evidence 
which takes account of "intentions". This is because 
intentions express a dimension of human experience 
which cannot be reached (let alone reduced) by the 
methods of strict empirical science. 
Now human experience cannot claim this complexity 
just because it is constituted by a "web of 
meanings." 1 9 Anything is, for purposes of being in-
quired into, constituted by a web of meanings. But the 
point is that not all objects of study stand in the 
same relation to the constellation of meanings that 
supports them. A fossil, for example, is experienti-
ally indifferent to its existence; it carries within 
itself no meanings, no concerns by which it relates it-
self to the world or expresses an existential outlook. 
This is not to deny that a particular fossil may, in 
some metaphysical sense, enjoy some unique point of 
view, but even so, this unique perspective is of no 
conscious concern to the fossil. The meanings which 
constitute a fossil are given to it. People would not 
look to a fossil in order to discover what it might 
mean to be self-conscious or to help them understand 
themselves. 
Yet people do desire knowledge of this kind; human 
beings have a real interest in self-understanding. 
Beyond the merely practical usefulness of such knowl-
edge it enables them to become free to discover further 
what they do not yet fully know: what it can possibly 
or ultimately mean to be thinking beings in a seemingly 
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irrational and indifferent universe. They have an in-
terest in realizing this potential if only because 
knowing what their real interests are depends on their 
capacity to acquire self-knowledge. 
It follows that the methods and guiding principles 
of scientific philosophy are not sufficient to satisfy 
in its entirety the demand human beings make on knowl-
edge. One should not, on that count, belittle science; 
only a mind too long lain fallow could doubt the impor-
tance and intellectual force of scientific method. But 
one must not equate philosophical method with 
scientific. Such a move may be expedient, but it ob-
scures what philosophy is. To some it may yet be a 
comforting reminder that science is, historically, the 
child of philosophy, engendered by an activity which 
partakes of human experience as a whole. 
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